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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents a unique and efficient solver to the state estimation (SE) problem for the power grid,
based on probabilistic graphical models (PGMs). SE is a method of estimating the varying state values of
voltage magnitude and phase at every bus within a power grid based on meter measurements. However,
existing SE solvers are notorious for their computational inefficiency to calculate the matrix inverse, and
hence slow convergence to produce the final state estimates. The proposed PGM-based solver estimates the
state values from a different perspective. Instead of calculating the matrix inverse directly, it models the
power grid as a PGM, and then assigns potentials to nodes and edges of the PGM, based on the physical
constraints of the power grid. This way, the original SE problem is transformed into an equivalent proba-
bilistic inference problem on the PGM, for which two efficient algorithms are proposed based on Gaussian
belief propagation (GBP). The equivalence between the proposed PGM-based solver and existing SE solvers
is shown in terms of state estimates, and it is experimentally demonstrated that this new method converges
much faster than existing solvers.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Power grid is a complex energy delivery system comprised of a large number of individual components
and geographically dispersed communication systems. State estimation (SE) is a method of estimating the
varying state values of voltage magnitude and phase at every bus of a power grid. This is done by taking
a series of meter measurements of key parameters across the network and relaying those measurements to
the control center. These meter measurements are then used to estimate the voltage states based upon their
physical relations.
SE can be classified as DC SE and AC SE. AC SE estimates state values by solving a system of (complex)
nonlinear equations (considering both real and reactive power), while DC SE utilizes a linear approximation
of the nonlinear real power flow equations in AC SE to estimate the state values (while neglecting reactive
power) [1, 2]. Existing solvers to both DC SE and AC SE involve the calculation of the inverse of a
matrix. Direct matrix inverse methods (e.g., Gaussian elimination algorithm) are computationally infeasible
if the scale of the power grid (and hence the size of the matrix) is large. Iterative methods, such as the
Jacobi iterative method and the Gauss–Seidel iterative method, can avoid the calculation of matrix inverse.
However, one major issue with the iterative methods [3] is that they may require a very large number of
iterations and converge slowly or even cannot converge. To address this issue, we propose to solve SE from
a different probabilistic graphical model (PGM) perspective, which converges much faster and thus is a
much more efficient solution to the SE problem.
PGM [4] is a technique that offers a compact graph-based representation of joint probability distribu-
tions, and exploits conditional independencies among the random variables. PGM has been widely used in
many research areas such as machine learning, signal processing, computer vision, and data mining. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to leverage PGM to improve the efficiency of state estimation.
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The key idea of our proposed PGM solver to the SE problem is to represent a power grid as a PGM,
and then transform the original SE problem into an equivalent probabilistic inference problem on the PGM.
By doing so, the physical constraints and relations between components in the power grid are considered
explicitly in the PGM and during the computation. Moreover, by utilizing the Gaussian belief propagation
(GBP) algorithm to perform the probabilistic inference, each node in the PGM takes messages from all of its
neighbor nodes at each iteration, thus progressing more toward the final estimates at each iteration. Hence,
our proposed PGM solver requires much fewer iterations to converge.
Given the fast converging property of the proposed PGM solver, it has many potential applications.
For example, it can be used, together with the AC flow model, as an efficient and practical defense to the
well-known and well-studied false data injection attack (FDIA) [1] against a power grid.
1.2 Our Contributions
The contributions of this thesis include:
• We propose a novel framework to perform SE based on probabilistic graphical models (PGMs).
• We design two Gaussian belief propagation (GBP) algorithms to perform the probabilistic infer-
ence on our PGM.
• We prove and demonstrate the equivalence between existing SE solvers and the proposed PGM
solver in terms of state estimates.
• We demonstrate experimentally that the proposed PGM solver requires a much shorter running
time than standard SE solvers, particularly when the power grid is large.
• As an example application of the proposed PGM solver, we show that it can effectively and quickly
detect the FDIA, when used together with the AC flow model.
• All experiments are conducted with the MATPOWER simulator [5]. Codes are developed to per-
form DC SE and the proposed PGM solver, and to produce the meter measurements, for a variety
of power grid models.
3
1.3 Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide a brief overview of SE on both
DC and AC flow models, existing methods to solve SE, and FDIA against DC SE. In Chapter 3, we show
the background of probabilistic graphical model (PGM) and the inference algorithm. Chapter 4 details our
proposed PGM and designs two inference algorithms to solve SE. Chapter 5 evaluates our proposed method
on a series of experiments that compare PGM with standard SE. Chapter 6 explores the applicability of AC
PGM as a means of defense against FDIAs. Chapter 7 evaluates the resilience of PGM to FDIAs through
a number of experiments. Finally, the thesis is concluded in Chapter 8. Appendices A and B include
MATLAB code that was generated to perform some of the experiments.
1.4 My Own Contributions
Since I am not the sole individual responsible for the research for, work on, and composition of all
the material presented in this thesis, it is necessary that I identify my own personal contributions before
moving forward. I am largely responsible for most of the background research and work on standard DC
SE, AC SE, and FDIA reflected in Chapters 1, 2, and 6. I also conducted all of the experiments detailed in
Chapters 5 and 7 (with the exception of running the PGM tests in Chapter 5). The MATLAB code included
in Appendices A and B are also contributions for which I am solely responsible. In addition to this, I am
responsible for having edited all of the material presented in this thesis.
Chapters 3–4, which detail our probabilistic graphical model and its application to the power grid for
state estimation, is almost exclusively the work of Binghui Wang, who is the only other main contributor
to the content contained in this thesis. Where appropriate, I use singular personal pronouns throughout this
thesis to refer to myself as the main contributor. The use of plural pronouns outside of Chapters 3–4 are
used to indicate joint contribution on the part of both Binghui Wang and myself. Other contributors to the
work behind this thesis are Dr. Daji Qiao and Dr. Zhenqiang Gong, who oversaw my research process and
provided me with invaluable guidance and direction. It should also be noted that we have submitted a paper
for publication in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid that includes much of the material presented in this
thesis.
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CHAPTER 2. STATE ESTIMATION
2.1 State Estimation On DC And AC Flow Models
State estimation (SE) is a method of estimating state variables of a power grid so that operators can
monitor them from the control center. The state variables of interest are the voltage magnitude, |u|, and
phase, θu, at every bus in the network. In order to perform SE for a given power system, a set of meter
measurements need to be taken of various components across the network and reported to the control center.
These meter measurements can then be used along with topology information of the grid to estimate the
state variables. Table 2.1 summarizes the terms and notations used in Chapters 2 to 4.
When performing SE, one of the generator buses in the power system is selected to be the slack or
reference bus, at which the voltage phase is defined as θu = 0 radians. This leaves 2N− 1 unknown states
to be estimated, where N is the number of buses in the system. The task of SE is to estimate these 2N− 1
states, given the meter measurements and the network topology of the power system. At least 2N−1 meter
measurements are required to estimate 2N−1 states.
Let m represent the number of states (m = 2N − 1) and n represent the number of meter measure-
ments (n > m) utilized to perform state estimation. Moreover, we denote the m state variables as x =
[x1,x2, . . . ,xm]T , n meter measurements as z = [z1,z1, · · · ,zn]T , and the meter measurement errors as e =
[e1,e1, · · · ,en]T . Then, the relation between x, z, and e is encoded in the following system of equations:
z = h(x)+ e, (2.1)
where h(x) = [h1(x1, · · · ,xm),h2(x1, · · · ,xm), · · · ,hn(x1, · · · ,xm)]T is an n-dim vector function that estab-
lishes dependencies between x and z. Each meter measurement error ei is assumed to be Gaussian-distributed
with zero mean and variance σ2, i.e., ei ∼N (0,σ2i ).
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Table 2.1 Terms and notations used in Chapters 2 to 4
Symbol Definition
SE State estimation
AC SE Nonlinear state estimation
DC SE Linear state estimation
|u| Voltage magnitude
θu Voltage phase
N Number of buses
m Number of states
n Number of measurements
x State variables
z Meter measurements
e Meter measurement errors
J(x) Objective function
Λ Matrix of meter measurement error variances
H Jacobian matrix
x̃ Augmented state variables
z̃ Augmented meter measurements
H̃ Augmented Jacobian matrix
φṽi(x̃i) Node potential
ψṽi,ṽ j(x̃i, x̃ j) Edge potential
The goal of SE is to estimate state variables that best fit Eq. (2.1). Specifically, SE aims to minimize the
following objective function:
J(x) =
1
2
n
∑
i=1
(
zi−hi(x)
σi
)2
=
1
2
(z−h(x))T Λ(z−h(x)), (2.2)
where Λ is a diagonal matrix whose elements are reciprocals of the variances of meter measurement errors,
i.e., Λ = diag(σ−21 ,σ
−2
2 , · · · ,σ−2n ). Moreover, a matrix H(x) that contains the derivative of h(x) with respect
to each state variable xi is needed. Specifically, it is an n×m Jacobian matrix with full column rank, as
follows:
H(x) =

∂h1(x)
∂x1
∂h1(x)
∂x2
· · · ∂h1(x)
∂xm
∂h2(x)
∂x1
∂h2(x)
∂x2
· · · ∂hn(x)
∂xm
· · ·
∂hn(x)
∂x1
∂hn(x)
∂x2
· · · ∂hn(x)
∂xm

. (2.3)
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If h(x) relates state variables to meter measurements linearly, i.e., h(x) = Hx with a constant matrix H,
the above SE problem is called DC SE. In contrast, if h(x) relates state variables to meter measurements
nonlinearly, the above SE problem is called AC SE.
2.2 Existing SE Solvers
Existing solutions to SE are based on the fact that, at the minimum of J(x), the first-order optimality
conditions have to be satisfied. That is,
g(x) =
∂J(x)
∂x
=−HT (x)Λ(z−h(x)) = 0. (2.4)
In DC SE, the closed-form solution to Eq. (2.4) can be derived, which is in the following form:
x = (HT ΛH)−1HT Λz, (2.5)
In AC SE, since h(x) is a nonlinear function of state variables x, a closed-form solution to Eq. (2.4) can-
not be obtained. In practice, Newton-type methods are often used to iteratively estimate the state variables.
Specifically, the Newton method performs a Taylor series expansion of g(x) around x(k), and neglects the
higher-order terms. That is,
g(x(k)+∆x(k)) = g(x(k))+G(x(k))∆x(k) = 0, (2.6)
where
G(x(k)) =
∂g(x(k))
∂x
= H(x(k))T ΛH(x(k)). (2.7)
Then, with an initial setting x(0), the Newton method iteratively updates x(k) for k = 1,2, · · · , as follows:
∆x(k) =−(G(x(k)))−1g(x(k))
=
(
H(x(k))T ΛH(x(k))
)−1H(x(k))T Λ(z−h(x(k))); (2.8)
x(k+1) = x(k)+∆x(k). (2.9)
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Finally, the iterative process is terminated when the `∞-norm of ∆x(k) is less than a predefined threshold ε ,
or when the process reaches a predefined maximal number of iterations T .
2.3 A 3-bus Example
I will now use a simple 3-bus power grid model (which is taken from problem 9.1 in [6]) to illustrate
the SE process. The 3-bus model is shown in Fig. 2.1. The available information for the 3-bus model
includes the voltage magnitude at each bus (1 per unit or 1pu), the real power measurements on each of
the three transmission lines connecting the buses: z = [0.6pu,0.04pu,0.405pu]T , the standard deviation of
the meter measurements: σ = [0.02pu,0.01pu,0.002pu]T , and the susceptance on each of the transmission
lines: b12 = 5pu, b10 = 2.5pu, b20 = 4pu.
Figure 2.1 An example 3-bus power grid with 3 meters (M12,M10,M20) measuring the real power flow
across the transmission lines. The line susceptances are b12 = 5pu, b10 = 2.5pu, and b20 = 4pu,
respectively, with a 100 MVA base. Two states, |u| and θ , are present at each of the three buses.
In this example, all the voltage magnitudes are assumed to be 1pu. With Bus 0 being the slack
bus, i.e., θ0 = 0, we have θ1 and θ2 as the unknown states to be estimated.
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The unknown states to be estimated are θ1 (the voltage phase at Bus 1) and θ2 (the voltage phase at Bus
2). For AC SE, we use the nonlinear real power flow equations, as follows:
h1(x) = P12 = b12 sin(θ1−θ2) = 5sin(θ1−θ2);
h2(x) = P10 = b10 sin(θ1−θ0) = 2.5sinθ1;
h3(x) = P20 = b20 sin(θ0−θ2) =−4sinθ2.
Since h(x) is made up of nonlinear equations, the Jacobian is a function of the unknown states:
H(x) =

5cos(θ1−θ2) −5cos(θ1−θ2)
2.5cos(θ1) 0
0 −4cos(θ2)
 .
For DC SE, we use the linear approximations of the above real power flow equations, as follows:
h1(x)≈ 5θ1−5θ2;
h2(x)≈ 2.5θ1;
h3(x)≈−4θ2.
As a result, the Jacobian becomes a constant matrix:
H(x) = H =

5 −5
2.5 0
0 −4
 .
With Λ = diag(0.02−2,0.01−2,0.002−2), we have everything needed to obtain the state estimates, x̂.
Performing AC SE with Eq. (2.8), we obtain the estimates of θ1 and θ2 as 0.0174 and −0.1014 radians,
respectively. Performing DC SE with Eq. (2.5), we obtain the estimates of θ1 and θ2 as 0.0174 and−0.1013
radians, respectively. Since this example network is a very simple 3-bus system, the results of AC SE and
DC SE are very close to each other.
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2.4 Discussion
Note that both Eq. (2.5) and Eq. (2.8) involve the calculation of the inverse of a matrix. As noted
previously, direct matrix inverse methods are computationally infeasible if the matrix size is large, while
iterative methods may require a very large number of iterations and converge slowly or even cannot converge.
To address this issue, we propose a novel method to solve the SE problem from a different probabilistic
graphical model (PGM) perspective, which we will show converges much faster than existing solvers.
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CHAPTER 3. PROBABILISTIC GRAPHICAL MODEL
Probabilistic graphical model (PGM) [4] combines probability theory and graph theory. It offers a com-
pact graph-based representation of joint probability distributions, and exploits conditional independencies
among the random variables. Conditional independence can alleviate the computational burden. PGM has
been widely used in various research areas such as computer vision [7, 8], speech processing [9], time-
series and sequential data modeling [10], cognitive science [11], bioinformatics [12], signal processing [13],
communications and error-correcting coding theory [14], and in the area of artificial intelligence in general.
The framework of PGM could provide general techniques for inference (e.g., sum-product message-
passing algorithm, also known as belief propagation) [15] and learning [4]. Two popular representations of
graphical models are Markov networks based on undirected graphs (also known as Markov random fields),
and Bayesian networks based on directed graphs (also known as belief networks). In this work, we mainly
focus on Markov networks because the graphical representation of a power grid is undirected.
3.1 Markov Networks, Node Potential, And Edge Potential
Markov networks are represented by undirected graphs. Given an undirected graph G̃ = (Ṽ , Ẽ), where
Ṽ is a set of nodes and Ẽ is a set of edges. Each node ṽi ∈ Ṽ is associated with a random variable x̃i. Markov
networks specify a node potential φṽi(x̃i) (also known as “evidence”) for each node ṽi, and specify an edge
potential ψṽi,ṽ j(x̃i, x̃ j) (also known as “compatibility functions”) for each edge (ṽi, ṽ j) ∈ Ẽ. Then, Markov
networks define a joint probability distribution over all random variables as follows:
p(x̃) = p(x1, · · · ,x|Ṽ |) =
1
Z ∏
ṽi∈Ṽ
φṽi(x̃i) ∏
(ṽi,ṽ j)∈Ẽ
ψṽi,ṽ j(x̃i, x̃ j), (3.1)
where Z = ∑x̃i ∏ṽi∈Ṽ φṽi(x̃i)∏(ṽi,ṽ j)∈Ẽ ψṽi,ṽ j(x̃i, x̃ j) is called the partition function, which is used to normalize
the probabilities.
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Nevertheless, performing inference for each variable, i.e., calculating the marginal distribution of each
variable, involves a summation of exponential terms for discrete variables, or an integration for continuous
variables. This renders the direct computation intractable for a large number of variables. Fortunately, the
underlying graph structure, and thereby the introduced factorization of the joint probability, can be exploited
via belief propagation [15].
3.2 Inference Via Belief Propagation
Belief propagation (BP), also called sum-product, is a message-passing algorithm to perform inference
on graphical models. BP is originally derived for exact inference in trees [15], and then generalized to a
general graph even with loops. Specifically, BP functions by passing real-valued messages across edges in
the graph and is comprised of two computational rules: sum-product rule and product rule.
Sum-product rule: Messages mṽi→ṽ j(x̃ j) are sent on each edge (ṽi, ṽ j) ∈ Ẽ from ṽi to ṽ j. If x̃ j is a discrete
random variable, the messages are updated as follows:
mṽi→ṽ j(x̃ j) = ∑
x̃i
ψṽi,ṽ j(x̃i, x̃ j)φṽi(x̃i) ∏
vk∈N(ṽi)\ṽ j
mvk→ṽi(x̃i), (3.2)
where N(ṽi) denotes the neighbor nodes of ṽi, and N(ṽi)\ṽ j means node ṽ j is excluded from the neighbor
nodes. If x̃ j is a continuous random variable, the messages are updated as follows:
mṽi→ṽ j(x̃ j) =
∫
x̃i
ψṽi,ṽ j(x̃i, x̃ j)φṽi(x̃i) ∏
vk∈N(ṽi)\ṽ j
mvk→ṽi(x̃i)dxi. (3.3)
Fig. 3.1 visualizes the sum-product rule.
𝑣"
𝑣#
𝑣$
𝑣%
𝒎𝒗𝒊→𝒗𝒋(𝒙𝒋)
𝑣.
𝛟01 (𝑥")
𝞿01,05(𝑥", 𝑥.)
…
𝒎𝒗𝒕→𝒗𝒊(𝒙𝒊)
𝒎𝒗𝒔→𝒗𝒊(𝒙𝒊)
𝒎𝒗𝒌→𝒗𝒊(𝒙𝒊)
Figure 3.1 Sum-product rule
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Product rule: If the Markov network does not have a loop, the sum-product algorithm is exact [15],
meaning that, if we use the sum-product algorithm, the marginals (also known as beliefs) p(x̃i) obtained via
the following product rule are guaranteed to converge to the true marginals:
p(x̃i) = φṽi(x̃i) ∏
k∈N(ṽi)
mvk→ṽi(x̃i). (3.4)
Fig. 3.2 visualizes the product rule.
𝑣"
𝑣#
𝑣$
𝑣%
𝒎𝒗𝒊→𝒗𝒋(𝒙𝒋)
𝑣.
𝛟01 (𝑥")…
𝒎𝒗𝒕→𝒗𝒊(𝒙𝒊)
𝒎𝒗𝒔→𝒗𝒊(𝒙𝒊)
𝒎𝒗𝒌→𝒗𝒊(𝒙𝒊)
Figure 3.2 Product rule
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CHAPTER 4. STATE ESTIMATION: A PGM PERSPECTIVE
In this chapter, we describe our proposed approach to perform SE from a unique perspective, based on
PGMs. Comparing with existing SE solvers (shown in Fig. 4.1), our approach consists of the following three
steps (shown in Fig. 4.2).
Iterative 
Methods 
(e.g., Jacobi)
h(x)
z
Ʌ
Estimated 
value of x
Figure 4.1 Flowchart of existing SE solvers
Graph Construction
SE to PGM 
Transformation
Solving 
PGM 
via GBP
Graph
PGM
h(x)
z
Ʌ
Marginal 
distribution 
of x
Figure 4.2 Flowchart of our proposed PGM method
First, we model the power grid as an undirected graph (Section 4.1). Then, we contruct a PGM and
assign potentials to nodes and edges of the PGM, based on the physical constraints of the power grid,
which, in turn, transforms the original state estimation problem into an equivalent inference problem on the
PGM (Section 4.2). Finally, we apply Gaussian Belief Propagation (GBP) and design two GBP algorithms
to infer the state variables of our PGM, which produce the final state estimation results (Section 4.3).
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4.1 Modeling A Power Grid As A Graph
We represent the power grid as an undirected graph G = (V,E). Each node vi ∈ V represents a bus.
Each edge in E represents a power transmission line between two buses. The weight of each edge is the
impedance of the corresponding power transmission line. For each node vi ∈V , a node v j ( 6= vi) is a neighbor
of vi if and only if there is an edge between them. The power grid state at a node is determined by (1) the
states of its neighbors, and (2) the impedance of the transmission lines between the node and its neighbors.
Therefore, we can constrain each node in the power grid graph with local equations, which describe the
relation between its state and its neighbors’ states. Subsequently, we can use a set of local equations to
represent the constraints for the entire power grid, which are given in Eq. (2.1).
Throughout this section, we will use the same example 3-bus power system introduced in Section 2.3
and shown in Fig. 2.1, to illustrate our proposed PGM method, step by step. In the first step, this 3-bus
power system is represented by the graph in Fig. 4.3a.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.3 (a) Graph representation of the example 3-bus power system. (b) The corresponding PGM
graph.
4.2 Transforming SE To PGM Problem
The second step of our approach is to transform SE to an inference problem on a PGM. Next, we first
describe how to do it for DC SE, and then we generalize it to AC SE.
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4.2.1 Transforming DC SE To Inference Problem On A PGM
The goal of DC SE is to solve Eq. (2.5) to produce an estimation of state variables x. When leveraging
PGM for probabilistic inference, we require H to be a square matrix. However, H usually is not square in
power grids. To address this issue, we adopt the following two steps:
• Step I: We transform Eq. (2.5) to a more concise form. Specifically, we denote Ĥ = Λ1/2H and
ẑ = Λ1/2z, where Λ1/2 = diag(σ−11 ,σ
−1
2 , · · · ,σ−1n ). Then, Eq. (2.5) becomes:
x =
(
ĤT Ĥ
)−1ĤT ẑ. (4.1)
• Step II: We construct an augmented (m+n)× (m+n) matrix H̃ for Ĥ as:
H̃ =
 Im×m ĤT
Ĥ −λ In×n
 , (4.2)
where Im×m and In×n are an m×m identity matrix and an n× n identity matrix, respectively. λ is a
small constant. Similarly, we define an augmented (m+ n)-dim vector of state variables x̃ = [x;y],
where y is an n-dim auxiliary variable vector, and an augmented (m+ n)-dim measurement vector
z̃ = [0m; ẑ], where 0m is an m-dim zero vector.
Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. As λ → 0, the first m elements of the solution x̃ to z̃ = H̃x̃ are equivalent to the solution x to
Eq. (2.5) - the original SE problem.
Proof. We split z̃ = H̃x̃ into the following two equations:
0m = x+ ĤT y; (4.3)
ẑ = Ĥx−λy. (4.4)
Then, by combining Eqs. (4.3) and (4.4), we have:
x =
(
ĤT Ĥ+λ Im×m
)−1ĤT ẑ, (4.5)
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which is the first m elements of x̃. When λ → 0, we then have Eq. (4.1), which is exactly the solution to
Eq. (2.5).
Given Theorem 1, we can translate the original SE problem, whose goal is to solve z̃ = H̃x̃ determinis-
tically, to an equivalent probabilistic inference problem on a PGM. To be specific, we first convert z̃ = H̃x̃
to an optimization problem as follows:
H̃x̃ = z̃⇐⇒ H̃x̃− z̃ = 0 (4.6)
⇐⇒min
x̃
(1
2
x̃T H̃x̃− z̃T x̃
)
(4.7)
⇐⇒max
x̃
(
− 1
2
x̃H̃x̃+ z̃T x̃
)
, (4.8)
where the equivalence between Eq. (4.7) and Eq. (4.6) is obtained by setting the derivative of the term in
Eq. (4.7) with respect to x̃ to be zero. Then, we can obtain the solution to Eq. (2.5) via maximizing the
following joint Gaussian probability density function (pdf):
p(x̃) = exp
(
− 1
2
x̃T H̃x̃+ z̃T x̃
)
. (4.9)
We now can use a Markov network to characterize the joint Guassian pdf. Specifically, we begin by
constructing an undirected graph G̃ = (Ṽ , Ẽ), where Ṽ is a set of nodes in one-to-one correspondence with
the augmented state variables x̃ = [x;y], and Ẽ is a set of undirected edges determined by the non-zero
entries of the square matrix H̃. Then, we factorize the joint Gaussian pdf into the following form:
p(x̃) =
1
Z ∏
ṽi∈Ṽ
φṽi(x̃i) ∏
(ṽi,ṽ j)∈Ẽ
ψṽi,ṽ j(x̃i, x̃ j), (4.10)
where
Z = ∑
x̃i
∏
ṽi∈Ṽ
φṽi(x̃i) ∏
(ṽi,ṽ j)∈Ẽ
ψṽi,ṽ j(x̃i, x̃ j). (4.11)
φṽi and ψṽi,ṽ j are the node potential and edge potential associated with the undirected graph G̃, which are
defined as:
• node potential: φṽi(x̃i) = exp
(
− 12 H̃iix̃
2
i + z̃ix̃i
)
;
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• edge potential: ψṽi,ṽ j(x̃i, x̃ j) = exp
(
− 12 x̃iH̃i jx̃ j
)
.
With the above analysis, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The solution x̃ to z̃ = H̃x̃ is equal to the inference of the vector of marginal means µ over the
graph G̃ with the associated joint Gaussian pdf p(x̃)∼N (µ,H̃−1).
The proof of Theorem 2 is provided in [3]. Now, with Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we have completed
the transformation from the original DC SE problem to the problem of probabilistic inference on a PGM.
4.2.2 Transforming AC SE To Inference Problem On A PGM
The goal of AC SE is to solve Eq. (2.4) to produce an estimation of state variables x. However, since
h(x) is a nonlinear function of x, we cannot obtain an analytic solution for h(x) directly, unlike we have done
for DC SE. Therefore, in practice, Newton-type methods are often applied to iteratively estimate the state
variables. At each iteration k, we need to calculate Eq. (2.8) to update ∆x(k). For the ease of description, we
rewrite Eq. (2.8) by omitting the iteration index, as follows:
∆x =
(
HT ΛH
)−1HT Λ(z−h(x)). (4.12)
Comparing Eq. (4.12) with Eq. (2.5), we observe that the only difference is, Eq. (4.12) uses the term z−h(x),
while Eq. (2.5) uses the term z. Therefore, we can transform the original AC SE problem to the problem of
probabilistic inference on a PGM, by simply denoting ẑ = Λ1/2(z−h(x)) and then following the same steps
as in Section 4.2.1 for DC SE.
4.2.3 Example
Now, we continue with the 3-bus example to illustrate how to construct a PGM. In this example, since
m = 2 and n = 3, we introduce three auxiliary state variables: y1 for transmission line between Bus 1 and
Bus 2, y2 for transmission line between Bus 1 and Bus 0, and y3 for transmission line between Bus 2 and
Bus 0, as shown in Fig. 4.3a. As a result, the augmented state variables are:
x̃ = [x;y] = [x1;x2;y1;y2;y3], (4.13)
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the augmented meter measurements are:
z̃ = [02;Λ1/2ẑ] = [0;0;30;4;202.5], (4.14)
and
H̃ =
 I2×2 ĤT
Ĥ −λ I3×3

=

1 0 250 250 0
0 1 −250 0 −2000
250 −250 −λ 0 0
250 0 0 −λ 0
0 −2000 0 0 −λ

. (4.15)
Each auxiliary state variable is represented as an additional node in the PGM, as shown in Fig. 4.3b. Since
y1 connects to and depends on θ1 and θ2, node ṽ3 (for y1) is connected to both ṽ1 (for θ1) and ṽ2 (for θ2) in
the PGM. Similarly, we connect ṽ4 (for y2) with ṽ1 (for θ1), and connect ṽ5 (for y3) with ṽ2 (for θ2). Since
Bus 0 is the slack bus, it does not have a corresponding node in the PGM.
The node potential of node ṽ1 in the PGM is defined as:
φṽ1(x̃1) = exp
(
−1
2
H̃1,1x̃21 + z̃1x̃1
)
= exp
(
−1
2
θ
2
1
)
. (4.16)
Similarly, we can obtain the node potentials of other nodes:
φṽ2(x̃2) = exp
(
− 1
2
θ
2
2 ), (4.17)
φṽ3(x̃3) = exp
(λ
2
y21 +30y1), (4.18)
φṽ4(x̃4) = exp
(λ
2
y22 +4y2), (4.19)
φṽ5(x̃5) = exp
(λ
2
y23 +202.5y3). (4.20)
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The edge potential of edge (ṽ1, ṽ3) is defined as:
ψṽ1,ṽ3(x̃1, x̃3) = exp
(
−1
2
θ1y150h11
)
= exp(−125θ1y1) . (4.21)
Similarly, we can obtain the edge potentials of other edges:
ψṽ1,ṽ4(x̃1, x̃4) = exp
(
−125θ1y2), (4.22)
ψṽ2,ṽ3(x̃2, x̃3) = exp
(
125θ2y1), (4.23)
ψṽ2,ṽ5(x̃2, x̃5) = exp
(
1000θ2y3). (4.24)
4.3 Solving The PGM Problem Via Gaussian Belief Propagation
The third step is to solve the probabilistic inference problem on the constructed PGM via belief propa-
gation.
4.3.1 Gaussian Belief Propagation
As nodes in our PGM are characterized by Gaussian random variables, the associated belief propagation
algorithm is also called Gaussian belief propagation (GBP) [3, 16]. As we have discussed in Section 3.2, for
the graph G̃ composed of node potentials φṽi(x̃i) and edge potentials ψṽi,ṽ j(x̃i, x̃ j), we have the sum-product
rule and product rule. With these two rules and the property that the product of Gaussian distributions is still
a Gaussian distribution, we have the exact form for each passing message as follows [16]:
mṽi→ṽ j(x̃ j) = N (µi j,P
−1
i j ), (4.25)
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where
Pi\ j = Pii + ∑
ṽk∈N(ṽi)\ṽ j
Pki; (4.26)
µi\ j = P
−1
i\ j (Piiµii + ∑
ṽk∈N(ṽi)\ṽ j
Pkiµki; (4.27)
Pi j =−H̃2i jP−1i\ j ; (4.28)
µi j =−P−1i j H̃i jµi\ j. (4.29)
After several iterations of message passing, i.e., calculating Pi j and µi j until they converge with respect to
a small ε , we obtain the marginals of x̃i’s which are Gaussian random variables N (µi,P−1i ) with precision
and mean as follows:
P−1i = (Pii + ∑
ṽk∈N(ṽi)
Pki)−1; (4.30)
µi = P−1i (Piiµii + ∑
ṽk∈N(ṽi)
Pkiµki). (4.31)
Finally, we obtain the solution to Eq. (2.5) as follows:
x = x̃[1 : m] = [µ1; µ2; · · · ; µm]. (4.32)
4.3.2 Speeding Up Message-Passing In GBP
Recently, it has been showed in [17, 18] that, when calculating the message mṽi→ṽ j(x̃ j) from node ṽi
to ṽ j, including the message mṽ j→ṽi(x̃i) from node ṽ j to ṽi can speed up the computation as the passing
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messages can be computed in parallel, while not sacrificing the performance. In doing so, we have:
P̂i = Pii + ∑
ṽk∈N(ṽi)
Pki; (4.33)
µ̂i = P̂−1i (Piiµii + ∑
ṽk∈N(ṽi)
Pkiµki); (4.34)
Pi j =−H̃2i jP̂−1i ; (4.35)
µi j =−P−1i j H̃i j µ̂i. (4.36)
Then, we have the marginal Gaussian pdf N (µi,P−1i ) for each x̃i with precision and mean as follows:
P−1i = P̂i
−1; (4.37)
µi = P−1i µ̂i. (4.38)
The detailed implementations of our PGM/GBP solver for DC SE and AC SE are shown in Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2, respectively.
Algorithm 1 GBP DC (PGM/GBP solver for DC SE)
Input: G = (V,E), H, z, Λ, λ , ε , and T .
Output: x̃[1 : m].
Initialize t = 0 and x(t) with x(t)i ∼N (0,1).
Initialize P(t)ii = H̃ii, µ
(t)
ii = z̃i/H̃ii; P
(t)
ki = 0,µ
(t)
ki = 0,∀k 6= i.
Initialize P(t+1)i j = ∞, µ
(t+1)
i j = ∞, for (i, j) ∈ Ẽ.
Initialize P(t+1)i j = 0, µ
(t+1)
i j = 0, for (i, j) /∈ Ẽ.
Construct matrix Ĥ = Λ1/2H and ẑ = Λ1/2z.
Construct augmented matrix H̃ =
[
Im×m, ĤT ;Ĥ,−λ In×n
]
.
Construct augmented graph G̃ = (Ṽ , Ẽ).
while ‖P(t+1)−P(t)‖∞ ≥ ε and ‖µ(t+1)−µ(t)‖∞ ≥ ε and t < T do
Update P̂(t+1)i = P
(t)
ii +∑ṽk∈N(ṽi) P
(t)
ki ,∀i ∈ Ṽ ;
Update µ̂(t+1)i = (P̂
(t+1)
i )
−1(P(t)ii µ
(t)
ii +∑ṽk∈N(ṽi) P
(t)
ki µ
(t)
ki ),∀i ∈ Ṽ ;
Update P(t+1)i j =−H̃
−2
i j /P̂
(t+1)
i ,∀(i, j) ∈ Ẽ;
Update µ(t+1)i j =−(P
(t+1)
i j )
−1H̃i j µ̂
(t+1)
i ,∀(i, j) ∈ Ẽ;
t = t +1.
end while
return x̃i = µ
(t)
i = µ̂
(t)
i /P̂
(t)
i ,∀i.
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Algorithm 2 GBP AC (PGM/GBP solver for AC SE)
Input: G = (V,E), z, Λ, λ , ε , and T .
Output: x̃[1 : m].
Initialize t = 0 and x(t) with x(t)i ∼N (0,1).
Initialize x(t) with x(t)i = ∞.
Compute h(x(t)) and H(x(t)).
Compute z(t) = z−h(x(t)).
while ‖x(t+1)−x(t)‖∞ ≥ ε and t < T do
Compute ∆x(t) = GBP DC(G,H(x(t)),z(t),Λ,λ ,ε,T )
Update x(t+1) = x(t)+∆x(t).
Update h(x(t+1)) and H(x(t+1)).
Update z(t+1) = z−h(x(t+1)).
t = t +1.
end while
return x̃ = x(t).
4.3.3 Example
We continue with the 3-bus example. Given the node potentials and edge potentials defined in Sec-
tion 4.2.3, we can define the joint Gaussian pdf in Eq. (4.10) and use GBP to infer the marginal mean
for each x̃i. For instance, for DC SE, by running Algorithm 1 with λ = 1e− 5 and ε = 1e− 5, our GBP
terminates in three iterations. The estimated mean values in the three iterations are:
µ
(1) = [0.0564,−0.3291,0.4923,−0.4930,−0.0621], (4.39)
µ
(2) = [0.0174,−0.1013,0.6444,−0.6441,−0.0803], (4.40)
µ
(3) = [0.0174,−0.1013,0.6437,−0.6434,−0.0799]. (4.41)
By selecting the first two elements of µ(3), our PGM method yields the same results as those estimated by
existing SE solvers (i.e., θ1 = 0.0174,θ2 =−0.1013, as shown in Section 2.3).
4.4 Existing SE Solvers Versus Our Proposed PGM/GBP Solver
Existing SE solvers either directly calculate the matrix inverse (e.g., using the Gaussian elimination al-
gorithm) to obtain a closed-form solution, or leverage iterative methods (such as the Jacobi iterative method
and the Gauss-Seidel iterative method) to accelerate the calculation. It has been proved in [3, 17, 18] that the
GBP solver for a system of linear equations is identical to the Gaussian elimination algorithm, and the GBP
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solver incorporating two-way message passing (i.e., speedup) is identical to the Jacobi iterative method. In
Chapter 5, we will use experimental results to demonstrate the equivalence between our proposed PGM/GBP
solver and existing SE solvers in terms of state estimation results.
4.5 Complexity Analysis
Our proposed PGM/GBP solver and existing SE solvers all involve the calculation of matrix inverse:
Eq. (2.5) for the DC case or Eq. (4.12) for the AC case. Without loss of generality, we only focus on the
computational complexity of solving Eq. (2.5) for the DC case. Similar trends can be observed for solving
Eq. (4.12) for the AC case.
As shown in Algorithm 1, our method solves Eq. (2.5) in an iterative process. At each iteration, it first
calculates each P̂i and µ̂i, with each traversing all nodes and all edges in G̃ once. Then, it calculates each Pi j
and µi j, which also traverse all edges in G̃ once. Thus, the computational complexity of our method at each
iteration is 4|Ẽ|+2|Ṽ |. From Eq. (4.2), we know that |Ẽ|= 2|E|+(m+n), |Ṽ |= m+n, and |E|> (m+n).
Therefore, the dominating computational complexity of our method at each iteration is O(|E|). With T1
iterations to reach the stop conditions, our PGM/GBP solver has a dominating computational complexity of
O(T1 · |E|).
Existing SE methods solve the matrix inverse in Eq. (2.5) either directly or in an iterative process. Direct
matrix inverse methods, such as the Gaussian elimination algorithm, involve matrix-matrix additions and
multiplications, while iterative methods only require matrix-vector additions and multiplications. Moreover,
iterative methods can exploit the matrix sparsity to further reduce the computational complexity [19]. Thus,
in general, iterative methods are more efficient than direct matrix inverse methods, particularly when the
matrix size is large. More specifically, direct matrix inverse methods have a computational complexity of
O(nm2 + nm+m3) to obtain a closed-form solution to Eq. (2.5). Iterative methods, such as the Jacobi
iterative methods and the Gauss–Seidel iterative methods, have a computational complexity of O(T2 · |E|)
to solve Eq. (2.5), where T2 is the number of iterations to reach the same stop conditions as our PGM/GBP
solver.
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The main drawback of existing SE solvers is that, under certain conditions, the iterative process con-
verges slowly or even cannot converge (i.e., diverge), which leads to a very large T2. However, as demon-
strated empirically in [3, 18], our PGM/GBP solver converges faster and has a relatively small T1. As a
result, it is more efficient than existing SE solvers. We will further validate this claim in Section 5.3 with
experimental results. The reasons for the superior efficiency performance of our proposed PGM/GBP solver
may be due to the following reasons. First, by transforming the SE problem to a probabilistic inference prob-
lem on a PGM, the physical constraints and relations between components in the power grid are considered
explicitly in the PGM and during the computation. Second, by utilizing the GBP algorithm to perform prob-
abilistic inference, each node in the PGM takes messages from all of its neighbor nodes at each iteration,
thus progressing more toward the final estimates at each iteration hence a smaller number of iterations.
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CHAPTER 5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: PGM
5.1 Experimental Setup
We have conducted a number of experiments to: (1) demonstrate the equivalence of existing SE solvers
and our proposed PGM method in terms of the resultant state estimates (Section 5.2); and (2) compare their
efficiency in terms of computational time (Section 5.3).
All the experiments are conducted using MATPOWER 6.0 [5], which is a power flow solver package
available for MATLAB that allows one to conduct state estimation on power system test models. The
running time reported in Section 5.3 is tested on a 15-core Linux server with an Intel Core i5 2.7 GHz
processor for each core and 252.2 GB memory. We wrote our own codes for performing the proposed
PGM/GBP solver for AC SE. I personally developed the code for generating the meter measurements, which
is documented in Appendix A. The parameters used throughout the experiments include:
• N: Number of buses in the network;
• σ : Meter standard deviation;
• ε: Threshold value to terminate the iterations;
• T : Maximal number of iterations;
5.2 AC SE Versus AC PGM: State Estimates
We first compare AC PGM and AC SE in terms of the estimated states. The first experiment is evaluated
on the IEEE 14-bus system with varying meter standard deviations. Five trials are conducted for each level of
meter standard deviation, where different meter measurements are generated according to the corresponding
standard deviation. Results are plotted in Fig. 5.1a. The second experiment is evaluated on IEEE 14-bus,
30-bus, 57-bus, 118-bus, and 300-bus systems, with a fixed meter standard deviation of between 0.01 and
0.02, depending on the meter type. The configurations of these test systems can be found in their respective
source files provided with MATPOWER as case14.m, case30.m, case57.m, case118.m, and case300.m,
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respectively. Results are plotted in Fig. 5.1b. From these experiments, we observe that both methods
produce almost identical state estimates, regardless of the meter accuracy or the power grid size, which
demonstrates the practical equivalence between the two methods.
Note that small differences between the state estimates of the two methods have been observed in some
of the trials. This is because these two methods have different structures of the iterative process and thus
may terminate at different state values. However, since the termination threshold is small (i.e., ε = 1e−4),
differences are very minimal.
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Figure 5.1 Comparison of state estimates for AC SE and AC PGM.
5.3 AC SE Versus AC PGM: Running Time
We compare AC PGM with AC SE in terms of running time with different bus systems and different
thresholds ε to compare their computational efficiency. The experiment is evaluated on IEEE 14-bus, 30-
bus, 57-bus, 118-bus, 300-bus, as well as Pan European Grid Advanced Simulation and State Estimation
(PEGASE) 1354-bus and Polish 3012-bus systems. The configurations of latter two systems also can be
found in MATPOWER as case1354pegase.m [20, 21] and case3012wp.m, respectively. The maximal num-
ber of iterations T is set to be 1000. Figs. 5.2a and 5.2b display the running time of the standard AC SE
solver and our proposed AC PGM method when ε = 1e− 4 and ε = 1e− 5, respectively. In each trial,
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a variety of real and reactive power flows are measured, and both voltage magnitude |u| and phase θ are
estimated.
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Figure 5.2 Comparison of running time for AC SE and AC PGM.
We have the following observations: First, when the number of buses (N) is smaller, AC PGM needs
slightly more running time. This is because the matrix size dominates the running time when the number of
buses is small. Recall from Section 4.5 that AC PGM solves a nonlinear system with matrix size (m+n)×
(m+n), while AC SE deals with a smaller nonlinear system with matrix size m×n. Second, as the number
of buses is larger than a certain value, i.e., exceeds 300, AC PGM consumes less time than AC SE. This is
because the dominating computational complexities of both methods have the same order: O(E(H)), while
AC PGM needs far fewer iterations to converge than AC SE (see Section 4.5). For instance, when N = 3012
and ε = 1e−5, AC PGM converges at 98 iterations and 4734 seconds, while AC SE does not even converge
within 1000 iterations or 62496 seconds.
To summarize, we have experimentally verified that our proposed PGM solver for AC SE is more com-
putationally efficient, hence more practical, than existing solvers for power networks with a large number of
buses.
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CHAPTER 6. APPLICATION: DEFENSE AGAINST FALSE DATA INJECTION
ATTACKS
With our proposed PGM method as a fast and efficient alternative to solve the SE problem, there are
many practical applications for this method. In this chapter, as an example, I explain how our PGM method
may provide a practical defense against the well-known false data injection attacks (FDIAs). Table 6.1
summarizes the terms and notations used in Chapter 6.
Table 6.1 Terms and notations used in Chapter 6
Symbol Definition
FDIA False data injection attack
BDD Bad data detection
WSE or J Weighted squared error
r Residual
SSR Sum of squared residuals
σ2 Meter measurement variance
τ BDD threshold
α BDD significance level
za Altered measurement vector
a Attack vector
xbad Corrupted state estimates
c State error injection vector
6.1 State Estimation (SE) And Bad Data Detection (BDD)
After the state variables are estimated, it is important to check whether the estimated state values are
trustworthy and whether the measurements are accurate. The bad data detection (BDD) technique is used
for this purpose.
BDD is performed using an objective function in the form of a weighted squared error (WSE), which is
calculated based on the estimated state values, the accuracy of the measuring meters, and the actual meter
measurements. The WSE is a weighted sum of squared residuals (SSR), where a residual is the difference
between an observed measurement and an estimated measurement based on the estimated state values. For
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a residual of r = z−Hx, the SSR is defined as R = ||z−Hx||2, where || · ||2 is the `2-norm. The WSE can
then be determined from the SSR by taking into account the variances of the meter measurements and by
assigning greater weights to the more accurate meters, as follows [22]:
J =
n
∑
i=1
(zi−Hxi)2
σ2i
. (6.1)
Note that J2 follows a χ2(n−m)-distribution. Therefore, if J > τ , we say that the estimated state values
are untrustworthy with the probability of a false alarm being α , where τ is the threshold that can be decided
using the χ2(n−m)-distribution at the significance level of α [1].
6.2 False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs)
In practice, for large-scale power grid systems, DC SE is a popular option to estimate state variables
and correct measurement noises, because it is much more efficient than AC SE, which is computationally
expensive and thus less feasible.
Unfortunately, DC SE is known to be vulnerable to false data injection attacks (FDIAs). FDIA was first
reported in [1] and, since then, has been well-studied in the literature. It works as follows. The attacker
alters the meter measurements in such a way that the resulting state estimates are corrupted, while the SSR
and hence the WSE calculated by DC SE is the same as they would be without FDIA, thus escaping BDD.
To see this, let za be an altered measurement vector such that za = z+ a, where z is the original meter
measurement vector and a is an attack vector consisting of meter measurement errors injected by the attacker.
Further, let the corrupted state estimates be xbad = x+ c, where c is the difference between the estimated
state values with and without FDIA. We designate c as the state error injection vector since it contains the
error injected by the attacker into the state estimates. Note that the SSR with FDIA is given as follows:
||za−Hxbad ||= ||za−H(x+ c)||= ||z−Hx+(a−Hc)||. (6.2)
This tells us that FDIA can evade detection if the attacker injects an attack vector a such that a−Hc = 0.
When considering such FDIA against the power grid, it is necessary and helpful to classify different
kinds of attacks that a potential attacker could try to launch. [1] lists a number of different FDIA scenarios
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Table 6.2 FDIA types. Attacker access to the meters: UL (unlimited) or
LIM (limited). Attacker resources: UL (nlimited) or LIM (lim-
ited). States under attack: RAND (random) or TGT (targeted).
Impact on other states: TGT UC (targeted unconstrained) or
TGT CON (targeted constrained).
Scenario Access to theMeters
Attacker
Resources
States Under
Attack
Impact on
Other States
UL or LIM UL or LIM RAND or TGT UC or CON
1 UL UL RAND
2 UL UL TGT UC
3 UL UL TGT CON
4 UL LIM RAND
5 UL LIM TGT UC
6 UL LIM TGT CON
7 LIM UL RAND
8 LIM UL TGT UC
9 LIM UL TGT CON
10 LIM LIM RAND
11 LIM LIM TGT UC
12 LIM LIM TGT CON
(shown in Table 6.2), which can be classified according to: (1) whether an attacker has unlimited access
to all meters or only limited access to some meters in the network; (2) whether an attacker has unlimited
resources with which to pollute all of the accessible meters or only limited resources with which to pollute
only some of the accessible meters; and (3) whether the attacker injects random state estimates with random
errors (a random FDIA) or targets specific states to inject with specific errors (a targeted FDIA).
It should be noted that a random FDIA is not the same as introducing random errors in the meter mea-
surements, which can be easily detected by BDD. What is random in the case of a random FDIA is not the
errors introduced into the meter measurements, but the errors injected into the state estimates. That is to say,
a random FDIA takes place when the attacker introduces specific errors into specific meter measurement
values such that the attack will go undetected by BDD, but does not care which states are compromised or
by how much they are compromised as a result.
For targeted FDIA, on the other hand, the attacker designs the FDIA so as to inject specific state es-
timate errors into specific states. In other words, there are specific states that are targeted by the attacker
with the purpose of injecting specific errors into them. Targeted FDIA are distinguished into two sub-
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classifications: targeted unconstrained FDIA and targeted constrained FDIA. The difference between these
two sub-classifications is that for targeted unconstrained FDIA, the attacker designs the attack to introduce
specific errors into the targeted states, but designs the attack such that other non-targeted states may be
compromised as well. For a constrained FDIA, however, the attacker designs the attack such that only the
targeted states are compromised.
I will consider one particular kind of attack in the discussion that follows- a targeted constrained attack
where the attacker is assumed to have unlimited access to meters and unlimited resources. In a targeted
attack, the attacker designs the FDIA so as to inject specific state estimate errors into specific states. The
attack is said to be constrained in that the attacker designs the attack such that only the targeted states are
compromised. I chose to focus on this FDIA scenario because: (1) the attacker is granted the advantage of
being able to attack all of the meters; (2) in targeting specific states, the attacker presumably has a specific
goal in mind (they want to compromise the power grid in a particular fashion); and (3) by only introducing
specific false data into the targeted states, the attack may be less visible than if random errors were injected
into multiple states.
To illustrate how an FDIA works, I will continue to use the same example 3-bus power system shown in
Fig. 2.1. Recall that I showed in Section 2.3 that, with DC SE, the state variables are estimated as:
x = [θ1,θ2]T = [0.0174,−0.1013]T radians. (6.3)
With the given meter measurements z, the standard deviation of the meter measurements σ , and the Jacobian
H, we can calculate the WSE as:
J =
n
∑
i=1
(zi−Hxi)2
σ2i
= 0.2345. (6.4)
The χ2-distribution for this example network (with 3 meter measurements and 2 unknown states) yields a
WSE threshold of τ = 6.635 for a significance level of α = 0.01. As we would expect, the WSE is well
below the threshold when there are only measurement noises but without an FDIA attack.
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Now, suppose the attacker intends to inject an error of 0.5 radians into state θ1. That is, the false data
injection vector is c = [0.5,0]T , and the intended corrupted state estimates are:
xbad = x+ c = [0.5174,−0.1013]T . (6.5)
The attack vector needed to alter the meter measurements to generate the polluted state is:
a = Hc =

5 −5
2.5 0
0 −4

 0.5
0
=

2.5
1.25
0
 . (6.6)
With this attack vector added to the actual meter measurements, DC SE would yield exactly the same
WSE as above (i.e., 0.2345), thus producing the corrupted state estimates xbad while evading BDD.
6.3 Defense Against FDIAs
Many DC SE based defenses [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35] have been proposed to
deal with FDIAs. However, these defenses usually are hard to implement in practice because they often make
very strong assumptions [36]. For instance, most of these defenses assume that certain meter measurements
can be completed shielded from the attacker, which may not be realistic. Moreover, it has been shown in [36]
that, by slightly modifying the FDIA, DC SE based defenses could be rendered ineffective.
6.4 AC-Based Defense
A more intuitive and effective way to defend against FDIAs is to simply apply AC SE to estimate the
unknown states. Before illustrating this, it would be helpful to expand upon the difference between AC and
DC SE discussed in Chapter 2. As was stated there, the fact that DC SE has a closed form solution makes
it significantly more efficient than the iterative methods used for AC SE. However, the closed form solution
also makes DC SE more susceptible to FDIA.
Note that when performing AC SE, meter measurements are taken of both real and reactive power
injections to buses and power flows across transmission lines in the network. The nonlinear equations used
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to calculate the expected real (P) and reactive (Q) power flows from busi to bus j for AC SE are given below
in terms of the state variables (|u| and θu):
Pi j = |ui|2gi j−|ui||u j|gi jcos(θi−θ j)−|ui||u j|bi jsin(θi−θ j), (6.7)
Qi j =−|ui|2(bi j +bi)−|ui||u j|gi jsin(θi−θ j)+ |ui||u j|bi jcos(θi−θ j), (6.8)
where gi j + jbi j is the series admittance of the line and bi is the shunt susceptance at bus i. For DC SE,
the series conductance (gi j) and shunt susceptance (bi) are neglected, and the voltage magnitudes at all of
the buses in the network are assumed to be 1 per-unit or 1pu. As a result, only real power flows (P) are
measured for DC SE and only the voltage phases (θu) are estimated. Assuming the voltage phases are small,
Equation (6.7) is then approximated by the following linear equation [22]:
Pi j = bi j(θi−θ j). (6.9)
All of the functions used to obtain h(x) for DC SE are of this linear form. Accordingly, when the
derivative of Equation (6.9) is taken with respect to the voltage phase at every bus to obtain the Jacobian
matrix H from Equation 2.3, the resultant H is independent of the voltage states, which is what allows for
a closed-form solution in DC SE. For AC SE, however, the Jacobian will be consistent of the derivatives
of nonlinear Equations (6.7) and (6.8) with respect to the voltage states. These derivatives will themselves
be nonlinear equations, making for a much more computationally complex problem, making FDIAs more
difficult to implement.
To illustrate this, consider the 3-bus example. The difference here compared with DC SE is that the real
power measurements are defined in terms of their actual non-linear relationships to the unknown states (as
opposed to the simplified relationships used for DC). For the purposes of this example (as well as in the
experiments conducted in Section 7.3), it is important to note that I am making the same assumption that the
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voltage magnitude at every bus is 1pu for AC SE as is made for DC SE. That is to say, I am performing SE
with a simplified version of AC SE in this example.
The reason I am making this assumption is so that a better comparison can be made between DC and AC
SE in terms of the impact that the use of non-linear equations in AC SE makes on the ability to detect FDIA.
This example shows that by changing h(x) from a function of linear equations to non-linear equations, SE
is able to detect the FDIA that went undetected in the example in Section 6.2. By implication, standard AC
SE, which does not make the assumption that the voltage magnitude of every bus is 1pu, would likewise be
able to detect FDIA.
Applying this simplified version of AC SE to the 3-bus problem with the same attack vector as in the
previous section, we will observe a significantly larger WSE (i.e., J = 13.2042 as compared with J = 0.2345
for DC SE), well exceeding the threshold for BDD (τ = 6.635). As a result, the FDIA can be successfully
detected.
The reason why AC SE can successfully defend against FDIA is because it considers the underlying
nonlinear dependencies between states and measurements. Thus, the Jacobian matrix in AC SE is a function
of the unknown states to be estimated and changes at each iteration. This is unlike DC SE, where the
Jacobian matrix is constant over all iterations. As a result, in the case of AC SE with the presence of FDIA,
the altered meter measurements not only corrupt the state estimates, but also corrupt the Jacobian that is
used to obtain the state estimates. This leads to a large weighted squared error, meaning that the FDIA can
be detected by the BDD.
Although the AC SE-based defense is effective against FDIA, it is often considered a less practical solu-
tion. This is because AC SE is computationally expensive and time-consuming due to its slow convergence
or non-convergence property. Now, given that our proposed PGM solver to the AC SE problem is much more
efficient than existing solvers and converges much faster, it becomes more realistic to deploy PGM-based
AC SE to defend against FDIA in real power systems.
Before moving forward, it should be noted that the potential vulnerability of even nonlinear AC-based
SE to FDIA has been demonstrated by Jin et al. [37], who formulated attacks against AC SE as a convex
optimization problem, and solved for attack vectors via semidefinite programming. However, the proposed
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attack strategy assumes that an attacker has full knowledge of the power grid system. This means that it
would still be difficult for an attacker to launch an effective attack against AC SE (and by implication, AC
PGM) using this approach, as full knowledge of all system meter measurements is a strong assumption. A
more practical threat model would be one in which an attacker is only allowed to have partial knowledge
about the system. Perhaps attacks against AC SE under more practical threat models are still possible, but
to our knowledge this has yet to be demonstrated. Nevertheless, providing a means of defense against all
possible threats, including those with strong assumptions, would still be ideal. That being said, any further
means of defense that are developed for AC SE could theoretically be integrated into AC PGM as well,
which has the added benefit of being more efficient.
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CHAPTER 7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: DEFENSE AGAINST FDIA
7.1 Experimental Setup
I conducted a number of experiments to: (1) examine the susceptibility of DC SE to FDIA under dif-
fering conditions (Section 7.2); and (2) illustrate the immunity of AC SE/PGM to FDIAs (Section 7.3).
All of these experiments were conducted using MATPOWER 6.0 [5]. Because MATPOWER only offers
an open-source code for performing AC SE, I updated the provided code to perform DC SE as well (see
Appendix B).
All of the experiments in this chapter were conducted using the IEEE 14-bus system. For the experiments
in Section 7.3, I made the same assumption for AC SE/PGM as in the 3-bus example in Section 6.4, namely,
that the voltage magnitudes are 1pu and the same meter measurements are used for AC as DC SE/PGM.
Once again, this is done in order to offer a better comparison of the use of nonlinear versus linear equations
in SE/PGM for defending against FDIA.
For convenience, I denote our GBP-based solver on PGM that solves with linear and nonlinear equations
as DC PGM and AC PGM, respectively. It should be remembered for the purposes of these experiments that
the state estimate values obtained via SE and PGM are practically equivalent (see Sections 4.4 and 5.2). For
practical considerations, all of the FDIA in these experiments were constrained targeted attacks with either
unlimited resources or limited resources (scenarios 3 and 6 as defined in Table 6.2). My reasons for using
constrained targeted attacks with unlimited resources were explained in Section 6.2. I consider FDIAs with
limited resources as well to examine the susceptibility to FDIA even when the attacker is assumed to have
fewer resources.
The parameters used throughout these experiments are:
• N: Number of buses in the network;
• J: Weighted squared error (WSE);
• σ : Meter standard deviation;
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• ε: Threshold value to terminate the iterations;
• T : Maximal number of iterations;
• M: Number of states under the FDIA attack;
• K: Percentage of the meters that an attacker has resources to compromise;
• ci: State error injected into state i under FDIA;
By default, I set the number of states under attack to M = 2, the percentage of meters that an attacker has
resources to compromise to K = 100%, and the state error injection value to ci = π/3 radians. Moreover, I
set the threshold to ε = 1e−5 and the maximal number of iterations to T = 1,000 for both SE and PGM. The
BDD threshold for WSE is τ = 33.41, which is the threshold level for a χ2(n−m)-distribution with n = 30
meters and m = 13 states at a significance level of α = 0.01.
7.2 Susceptibility Of DC SE To FDIA
7.2.1 Successful Attack Ratio When Attacker Has Full Access To All Meters
In order to examine the susceptibility of DC SE to FDIA, I conducted an experiment in which the
attacker is assumed to have full access to all meters and desires to attack a specific number of states M
ranging from 1 to 13 (note that the total number of unknown voltage phase states in the IEEE 14-bus system
is 13). For each M, I randomly generated 1,000 unique attack vectors (or less if the maximum number of
unique attack vectors for a given M was less than 1,000) that could be used to launch an attack against that
specific number
of states. I then determined what percentage of those attacks could be successfully launched for various
amounts of attacker resources (K).
Figure 7.1 shows the results. We observe that as K increases, the attacker has more resources to com-
promise a greater number of meters, and thus can generate a greater number of successful attack vectors.
An interesting finding is that the attacker is able to generate a successful FDIA by polluting just 20% of the
meters, and can launch a successful attack against 10 states with 80% of the meters.
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Figure 7.1 Successful attack ratio versus number of compromised states M and amount of resources avail-
able K. Y-axis displays the percentage of successfully generated attack vectors with varying
amounts of resources. X-axis is the number of states M under attack.
7.2.2 Meters Needed For A Successful Attack
In this experiment, I investigated the percentage of total network meters an attacker needs to pollute to
launch a successful FDIA against DC SE that compromises a given number of states, M. The results, shown
in Figure 7.2, confirm what we observe in Figure 7.1. For instance, Figure 7.2 shows that between 50 and
70% of the meters would need to be polluted by an attacker in order to successfully launch an FDIA that
compromises five state values. Looking at Figure 7.1, we see that an attacker won’t be able to attack five
states with only enough resources to pollute 40% or fewer of the meters, but can always launch a successful
attack against five states with enough resources to pollute 80% of the meters, consistent with the results in
Figure 7.2.
As we would expect, the number of meters needed to successfully launch an FDIA generally increases
as the number of states being attacked increases. This trend continues until M is so great that all of the
available meter measurements must be altered by an attacker (11 or more for the IEEE-14 bus system).
7.3 AC SE/PGM Defense Against FDIA
To evaluate the effectiveness of AC SE/PGM based defenses against FDIAs, I simulated one particular
type of strong attacks: a targeted constrained attack. Here, the attacker is assumed to have unlimited
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Figure 7.2 Fraction of attacked meters versus number of compromised states M. Y-axis displays the per-
centage of meter values needed to be changed for a successful attack; X-axis displays the
number of states compromised in the attack.
resources and unlimited access to the meters. Once again, in a targeted attack, the attacker tries to inject
specific state estimate errors into specific states; an attack is said to be constrained in that the attacker
designs the attack in such a way that only the targeted states are corrupted [1].
In these experiments, I show the resilience of AC SE and AC PGM against FDIA. Figures 7.3a and 7.3b
display the weighted squared error J for both DC methods (DC SE and DC PGM) and AC methods (AC SE
and AC PGM) under successful FDIA against DC SE. For the experiment shown in Figure 7.3a, the attack
vectors are generated for various K and M = 2. For the experiment shown in Figure 7.3b, the attack vectors
are generated for various M and K = 100%. The BDD threshold is shown as the dashed line.
We observe that all attack vectors in both experiments can evade detection by DC methods, as their
generated weighted squared errors are below the χ2 threshold. However, the pollution of meter measure-
ments with these attack vectors can be easily detected by AC methods, whose weighted squared errors are
much larger than the threshold. This confirms the resilience of AC SE/PGM against FDIA which are di-
rected at DC SE, as was discussed in in Section 6.4. Taken in concert with the experimental conclusions of
Section 5.3, we can conclude that AC PGM is an efficient means of defending against FDIA.
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Figure 7.3 Comparison of WSE for DC SE/PGM and AC SE/PGM. In (a), we vary the percentage of com-
promisable meters (denoted as K), and in (b), we vary the number of states to attack (denoted
as M).
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION
This thesis presents a novel and efficient solver to the state estimation (SE) problem, based on prob-
abilistic graphical models (PGMs). The proposed PGM-based solver (1) models a power grid as a PGM
based on the physical constraints of the power grid, (2) transforms the original SE problem into an equiv-
alent probabilistic inference problem on the PGM, (3) uses Gaussian belief propagation (GBP) algorithms
to infer the marginal probability distributions of the state variables, and then (4) produces the final state
estimates. Experimental results show that the proposed PGM-based solver is more efficient than existing SE
solvers, while yielding the same state estimation results. Due to its excellent computational efficiency, our
proposed PGM-based solver may have many potential applications. I have highlighted one such application
in this thesis, namely, that it can serve as a practical defense against false data injection attacks (FDIAs).
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APPENDIX A. MATLAB METER MEASUREMENT GENERATION
I developed the following code to generate appropriate meter measurement values that can be used in
the state estimation code provided in MATPOWER (function test se [38]). The generated meter measure-
ment values are stored in the measurement index (idx), measurement (measure), and measurement variance
(sigma) structs that are defined in test se. To fully integrate my code, lines 17-45 in test se, where these
structs are defined, should be replaced with the code included in this appendix. It should be noted, however,
that in the version of my code included below the meter measurements are only generated for real power
flowing to or from various buses (which are the meter measurements of interest for DC SE). This code can
be altered to generate meter measurements for the other parameters on the power grid available for use in
AC SE as well.
First, the variance σ2 of the measurement error is designated in struct sigma for each kind of parameter
meter as discussed in Section 2.1. The parameters available for measurement in MATPOWER are real
power injected into the “from” end of a branch (PF), real power injected into the “to” end of a branch (PT),
generator real power injection (PG), reactive power injected into the “from” end of a branch (QF), reactive
power injected into the “to” end of a branch (QT), generator reactive power injection (QG), and bus voltage
magnitude (Vm). Bus voltage angle (Va) is never measured in SE since it is the state being estimated. In the
code included below, we only utilize real power injections to the “from” and “to” ends of a branch in keeping
with DC SE. The variance values for PF and PT are the default values provided in the test se function by
MATPOWER.
% specify measurement variances
sigma.sigma_PF = 0.02;//
sigma.sigma_PT = 0.02; //
sigma.sigma_PG = [];
sigma.sigma_Va = [];
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sigma.sigma_QF = [];
sigma.sigma_QT = [];
sigma.sigma_QG = [];
sigma.sigma_Vm = [];
Next, we perform a power flow analysis using the power flow function runp f provided with MAT-
POWER [39]. In this example, this is performed for case14, which corresponds to the IEEE 14-bus model.
However, any of the power grid models available in MATPOWER, regardless of the number of buses, could
be used instead. The results are stored in struct results14 to be accessed later on.
% specify measurements
results14 = runpf(case14);
The following variables define the index values that will be used to access the power flow results stored in
results14 for each parameter.
PF = 14;
PT = 16;
QF = 15;
QT = 17;
PG = 2;
QG = 3;
VM = 8;
Next, the meter measurement values are generated for all possible meters for the parameters of interest
(in our case, PF and PT for each branch). This is done by adding a randomly generated value of each
meter’s error to that meter’s per-unit measurement value. The error of each meter is generated by using the
MATLAB function normrnd [40] to derive a randomly generated number from a normal distribution with
mean 0 and variance equivalent to the measurement error variance of each parameter as defined above. The
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per-unit measurement values for each meter are simply the real power injections “from” and “to” each branch
divided by the base value (100 MVA) as determined by the power flow analysis and stored in results14.
sizePF = length(results14.branch(:,PF));
MPF = zeros(sizePF,1);
for i = 1:sizePF
MPF(i) = normrnd(0,sigma.sigma_PF) + (results14.branch(i,PF)/100);
end
sizePT = length(results14.branch(:,PT));
MPT = zeros(sizePT,1);
for i = 1:sizePT
MPT(i) = normrnd(0,sigma.sigma_PT)+ (results14.branch(i,PT)/100);
end
In the following code, the number of states, num states is defined as 13 (the total number of unknown
voltage angles) and the number of meters to be used, num M, is defined as 30 (though any number greater
than 13 and less than the total number of meters could possibly be chosen instead). Out of the total number
of meter measurement values that were generated above, 30 are randomly selected. The index for each of
these selected meter measurements is also defined.
size_M = sizePF + sizePT;
Mvec = zeros(size_M,1);
for i = 1:sizePF
Mvec(i) = MPF(i);
end
for i = 1:sizePT
Mvec(i + sizePF) = MPT(i);
end
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num_states = 13;
num_M = 30;
sel_ind = randsample(size_M, num_M);
Mm = sort(sel_ind);
sizePF2 = 0;
sizePT2 = 0;
for i = 1:num_M
if Mm(i) <= sizePF
sizePF2 = sizePF2 + 1;
end
if Mm(i)>sizePF && Mm(i) <= (sizePT+sizePF)
sizePT2 = sizePT2 + 1;
end
end
indPF = zeros(sizePF2,1);
mPF = zeros(sizePF2,1);
for i=1:sizePF2
indPF(i) = Mm(i);
mPF(i) = Mvec(Mm(i));
end
indPT = zeros(sizePT2,1);
mPT = zeros(sizePT2,1);
for i=1:sizePT2
indPT(i) = Mm(i+sizePF2)-sizePF;
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mPT(i) = Mvec(Mm(i+sizePF2));
end
Finally, the meter measurements and their corresponding indices are specified in struct measure and
struct idx to be used in test se when using MATPOWER to perform SE.
measure.PF = mPF;
measure.PT = mPT;
measure.PG = [];
measure.Va = [];
measure.QF = [];
measure.QT = [];
measure.QG = [];
measure.Vm = [];
% which measurements are available
idx.idx_zPF = indPF;
idx.idx_zPT = indPT;
idx.idx_zPG = []
idx.idx_zVa = [];
idx.idx_zQF = [];
idx.idx_zQT = [];
idx.idx_zQG = [];
idx.idx_zVm = [];
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APPENDIX B. MATLAB CODE FOR DC SE
MATPOWER provides MATLAB code within the function test se that can be used to perform AC SE.
However, in order to perform DC SE, I had to develop my own code that could be integrated into the code
already provided by MATPOWER, specifically within the subfunction doSE [41]. Shown below is the code
I developed for obtaining the proper values of h(x) and H for DC SE as defined in Section 2.1 by replacing
the code in doSE that is used to update H every iteration for AC SE. Specifically, lines 82-136 of doSE,
from the computation of the estimated measurements to the computation of the H matrix, should be replaced
with the code included in this appendix.
As in Appendix A, we only consider the measurements of real power injections into the “from” and “to”
ends of bus branches in the code below in keeping with DC SE.
The variable i is used in the if statement below to track the number of iterations performed in doSE to
obtain the state estimates. Since H is constant for DC SE, it need only be defined during the first iteration.
The following section of code details the setup for defining the Jacobian H.
%DC SE code
if i == 1
na = size(Va); % Va is a double storing voltage phase states
na = na(1); % na defined as the number of voltage phase states
H = zeros(num_M,n+1); % Jacobian matrix setup with size num_M (number of
measurements) x n+1 (total number of buses; n is number of unknown
voltage phases)
sizezPF = size(idx.idx_zPF); % idx.idx_zPF is a double storing the indices
for real power flow measurements "from" buses
sizezPF = sizezPF(1); % sizezPF stores total number of real power flow
measurements "from" buses
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sizezPT = size(idx.idx_zPT); % idx.idx_zPT is a double storing the indices
for real power flow measurements "to" buses
sizezPT = sizezPT(1); % sizezPT stores total number of real power flow
measurements "to" buses
Each of the elements of the Jacobian H is defined in the next section of code included on the following page.
Recall from Section 6.4 that the elements of the Jacobian for DC SE are derivatives of the linear real power
flow equations with respect to the voltage phase state values. In this particular case, each of the elements in
the Jacobian H is defined in accordance with the following criteria:
• The measurement of each real power injection into a “from” (PF) or “to” (PT) bus corresponds to
a row in H
• Let the PF measurements correspond to rows 1...n0 of H, where n0 is the total number of PF
measurements
• Let the PT measurements correspond to rows n0 + 1...n of H, where n is the total number of PF
and PT measurements and n−n0 is the total number of PT measurements
• The voltage phase of each bus (θcol) corresponds to a column in H
• Let f designate the “from” bus of the transmission line on which each row’s measurement was
taken
• Let t designate the “to” bus of the transmission line on which each row’s measurement was taken
• For each PF measurement, the linear real power flow equation is hrow = B f t(θ f −θt)
• For rows 1...n0 of H, the element in each column is equal to ∂hrow∂θcol
• For rows 1...n0 of H, all elements are zero except in columns f and t
• For rows 1...n0 of H, the element in column f is B f t
• For rows 1...n0 of H, the element in column t is -B f t
• For each PT measurement, the linear real power flow equation is hrow = Bt f (θt −θ f )
• For rows n0 +1...n of H, all elements are zero except in columns t and f
• For rows n0 +1...n of H, the element in column t is Bt f
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• For rows n0 +1...n of H, the element in column f is -Bt f
Note that the transmission line susceptance B f t or Bt f is equivalent to the imaginary component of the
admittance matrix (Y bus) element corresponding to the same “from” and “to” buses. Given the criteria from
the previous page, a Jacobian matrix for DC SE can be defined in MATLAB as follows:
fr = [];
tr = [];
for ia = 1:sizezPF
fr = f(idx.idx_zPF(ia));
tr = t(idx.idx_zPF(ia));
for l = 1:na
if fr == l
H(ia,l) = imag(Ybus(fr,tr));
elseif tr == l
H(ia,l) = -1*imag(Ybus(fr,tr));
end
end
end
fr = [];
tr = [];
for ia = 1:sizezPT
fr = f(idx.idx_zPT(ia));
tr = t(idx.idx_zPT(ia));
for l = 1:na
if tr == l
H(ia+sizezPF,l) = imag(Ybus(tr,fr));
elseif fr == l
H(ia+sizezPF,l) = -1*imag(Ybus(tr,fr));
end
end
53
end
H = H(:,nonref); % Removes the column for the reference bus and places the
columns of H in the correct order for use in doSE
end
In addition to defining the Jacobian matrix, H, we also need to define each of the linear power flow equations,
h(x), in terms of the voltage phase states during each iteration of doSE. Recall from Section 2.1 that the
goal of SE is to find the best fit for z−h(x) = e. Since the real power flow equations are simplified for DC
SE, we need to update h(x) accordingly. This can be done by following the criteria given below:
• The measurement of each real power injection into a “from” (PF) or “to” (PT) bus corresponds to
a row in h(x)
• Let the PF measurements correspond to rows 1...n0 of h(x), where n0 is the total number of PF
measurements
• Let the PT measurements correspond to rows n0 +1...n of h(x), where n is the total number of PF
and PT measurements and n−n0 is the total number of PT measurements
• Let f designate the “from” bus of the transmission line on which each row’s measurement was
taken
• Let t designate the “to” bus of the transmission line on which each row’s measurement was taken
• For each PF measurement, the linear real power flow equation is hrow = B f t(θ f −θt)
• For rows 1...n0 of h(x), the element in each row is equal to B f t(θ f −θt)
• For each PT measurement, the linear real power flow equation is hrow = Bt f (θt −θ f )
• For rows n0 +1...n of h(x), the element in each row is equal to Bt f (θt −θ f )
The corresponding code in for MATPOWER is as follows:
na = size(Va); % Va is a double storing voltage phase states
na = na(1); % na defined as the number of voltage phase states
hx = zeros(num_M,1); % Linear real power flow equation double setupt with
size num_M (number of measurements) x 1
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sizezPF = size(idx.idx_zPF); % idx.idx_zPF is a double storing the indices
for real power flow measurements "from" buses
sizezPF = sizezPF(1); % sizezPF stores total number of real power flow
measurements "from" buses
fr = [];
tr = [];
for ia = 1:sizezPF
fr = f(idx.idx_zPF(ia));
tr = t(idx.idx_zPF(ia));
hx(ia) = imag(Ybus(fr,tr))*(Va(fr)-Va(tr));
end
sizezPT = size(idx.idx_zPT); % idx.idx_zPT is a double storing the indices
for real power flow measurements "to" buses
sizezPT = sizezPT(1); % sizezPT stores total number of real power flow
measurements "to" buses
fr = [];
tr = [];
for ia = 1:sizezPT
fr = f(idx.idx_zPT(ia));
tr = t(idx.idx_zPT(ia));
hx(ia+sizezPF) = imag(Ybus(tr,fr))*(Va(tr)-Va(fr));
end
end
z_est = hx; % z_est is the double used to store the values of hx in doSE
